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The social security systems in 22 European countries are evaluated with a specially con-
structed indicator. It is based on a census-simulating model which combines both em-
pirical (statistical) and normative (rule-based) approaches. The individual answers of
unemployed on social security bene¯ts are normatively derived from their personal situa-
tions with the OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models. The empirical data about personal situations
are available from EuroStat. The goal is estimating the national average of net replace-
ment rates (NRR) for unemployed persons. Such an indicator of social security shows the
average degree with which social bene¯ts compensate the loss of previous earnings.
Thus, the paper suggests:
² (Methodology) a model of census simulation combining statistical data on the popu-
lation with individual answers computed with a rule-based model,
² (Indicator) an integral quantitative evaluation of social security in Europe, which
reveals its total decline by 2004 contrary to institutional improvements,
² (Analysis) an explanation of the decline by a structural change of European labour
markets with rapidly growing `atypical' employment groups (= part-time, tempo-
rary, self-employed, etc.) with a lower eligibility to social bene¯ts than normally
employed (= permanently full-time),
² (Policy implications) a possible resolution of European policy contradictions by the
\basic income model" with \°exinsurance".
Keywords: Composite indicators, social security, European welfare state, European
Union, \make work pay" policy.
JEL Classi¯cation:
C43 | Index Numbers and Aggregation, C51 | Model Construction and Estimation,
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Bene¯ts; Private Pensions, J38 - Public Policy.
EuropÄ aischer Wohlfahrtstaat und Politik "make work
pay" (Abstrakt)
Die soziale Sicherheit in 22 europÄ aischen LÄ andern wird mit einem Indikator evaluiert. Er
basiert auf ein Zensus-simulierenden Modell, das institutionelle und empirische AnsÄ atze
kombiniert. Die individuellen Antworten der Arbeitslosen Ä uber die zustehenden sozialen
Leistungen werden entsprechend der persÄ onlichen Situationen mittels der OECD Steuer-
Sozialleistungsmodelle regel-basiert berechnet. Die empirischen Daten Ä uber die persÄ onlichen
Situationen stellt EuroStat zur VerfÄ ugung. Das Ziel ist, die nationalen Durchschnitte
der Nettoersatzquoten (NEQ) fÄ ur Arbeitslose einzuschÄ atzen. Solch ein Indikator zeigt
den durchschnittlichen Prozentanteil, mit dem die sozialen Leistungen den Verlust der
vorherigen Verdienste kompensieren.
Das Papier schlÄ agt vor:
² (Methodologie) ein Modell der Zensus-Simulation, das statistische BevÄ olkerungsdaten
mit individuellen Antworten kombiniert, die von einem regel-basierenden Modell
berechnet werden,
3² (Indikator) eine quantitative Evaluierung der europÄ aischen sozialen Sicherheit, die
trotz institutioneller Verbesserungen ihren totalen RÄ uckgang im Jahr 2004 erlebt,
² (Analyse) eine ErklÄ arung des RÄ uckgangs durch eine strukturelle Ä Anderung des eu-
ropÄ aischen Arbeitsmarktes mit wachsenden atypischen BeschÄ aftigungsgruppen (Teil-
zeitbeschÄ aftigte, Befristete, SelbststÄ andige usw.), die geringere Sozialleistungen als
die DauervollzeitbeschÄ aftigten beziehen,
² (Politische Implikationen) eine mÄ ogliche Au°Ä osung der WidersprÄ uche zwischen eu-
ropÄ aischen Politiken mittels Grundsicherungsmodell zusammen mit einer Flexinsur-
ance (Flexibilisierungsversicherung).
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561 Political background
In recent years the foundations of the European welfare state are being persistently re-
considered. The solidarity is getting to be restricted to those who are unable to receive
a su±cient income, and the adherents of the economically more competitive and socially
more \hard" Anglo-Saxon model are becoming more in°uential. Employers wish to share
the competition burdens with employees, and politicians seek to shift the responsibility
for employment from state to individuals.
The general °exibilization of employment relations is already adopted by the Euro-
pean Union as a means to enhance economic performance and to support sustainable
development. It resulted in an increase of unemployment and in a disproportional growth
of the number of atypically employed, like part-time, ¯xed-term, or self-employed (Euro-
Stat 2005). The atypical employment is not only less secure but also provides less carrier
prospects and training chances (OECD 2002b, p. 156{159). Besides, it often disquali¯es
workers from social bene¯ts, since the eligibility of atypically employed is substantially
lower than that of permanently employed (OECD 2002b, p. 131).
The °exibilization of employment relations resulted in a new labour market situation.
In case of low wages or part-time jobs the \net incomes gained [are often] smaller than the
loss of out-of-work bene¯ts" (OECD 2004, p. 14). In other words, the Anglo-Saxon model
transferred to the continental Europe turned out to discourage a signi¯cant fraction of
labour force from active labour market participation.
To resolve this paradox, the policy \make work pay" has been launched. It is \charac-
terized by a trade-o® between income protection and maximizing the ¯nancial gain from
work" (OECD 2004, p. 92). It is aimed at stimulating employment by di®erent work
incentives, in particular by reducing \the part of the in-work earning that is, upon enter-
ing employment, \taxed away" by the combined e®ect of higher taxes and lower bene¯ts"
(OECD 2004, p. 13). However, the e±ciency of these measures remains questionable in
the background of growing part-time, temporary, and low-paid employment.
The unambiguously consistent measure of the policy \make work pay" is penalizing
low personal responsibility for being unemployed. Security bene¯ts are reduced to those
who do not participate in training programs and, generally, who are inactive in looking for
a new job. The unemployed are thereby forced to accept unfavorable working conditions
which puts in question collective agreements on wages, working hours and other key issues
of bargaining of trade unions and employers.
These policies make a natural pressure on social security which generosity is an obstacle
to make work pay. However, just the generosity of the social security guarantees that the
unemployed will not accept any job o®er and become \strike breakers" in the long-running
trade union struggle for labour rights. Therefore, an adequate evaluation of the generosity
of social security is more than just an academic question but rather a political argument
in negotiations of trade unions with national governments.
72 Measuring social security
In spite of a visible roll-back of European welfare from the level of the 1980s, most
empirical studies fail to detect a substantial decline in public support (Pettersen 1995,
Taylor-Gooby 1998, Roller 1999, Van Oorschot 1999, and Mau 2001). The illusion that
the social solidarity remains in force weakens the position of European welfarism, making
an impression that minor improvements are su±cient to adjust social security to current
needs. The focus made on governmental expenditures for social support (for references
see Adema and Ladaique 2005) is rather misleading because it does not take into account
increasing living costs and °exibilization of employment relations with longer periods of
unemployment and lower speci¯c payo®s per capita/months.
The variety and complexity of national social security systems complicate measuring
their properties. A breakthrough in standardizing their structural descriptions is due
to the OECD long-running project which progress is regularly reported in the book se-
ries Bene¯ts and Wages (formerly Bene¯t Systems and Work Incentives) and in annual
\Country chapters" downloadable from Internet (OECD 1998, 1999, 2002a, 2004, 2005).
This unifying approach paved the way for implementing national social security and
taxation rules in the OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models, also available form the OECD web-page,
which derives social security bene¯ts, net incomes, and other parameters for 28 OECD
countries. In particular, these models have been used to empirically estimate the e±ciency
of social security systems by their comparing with the statistics on houshold incomes in
labour market transitions; see (Immervoll and O'Donoghue (2003) and Immervoll et al.
(2005).
In continuation of these studies, the given paper suggests a census-simulating model
which combines both empirical and normative (= rule-based) features. The idea is to
use the OECD models to normatively derive individual answers of unemployed from their
personal situations, which statistical distribution is empirically known (= demographic
data in the terminology of EuroStat Labour Force Survey).
3 Census-simulating model
The census-simulating model is based on the following steps:
1. The unemployed are divided into demographically homogeneous groups with equal
eligibility to social security bene¯ts and with equal tax liability. Namely, we consider
103950 groups of unemployed resulting from their cross-tabulation by:
(a) 22 European countries
(b) seven control years: 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001{2004
(c) ¯ve age levels: 20§5, 30§5, 40§5, 50§5, 60§5 years
(d) three types of family: single, one-earner couple, two-earner couple
(e) di®erent number of children: 0{4
(f) six earnings levels: 40, 50, 67, 100, 150, and 200% of the national average
production wage (the OECD reference)
8(g) nine unemployment duration levels: just become unemployed, < 1 month, 1{2,
3{5, 6{11, 12{17, 18{23, 24{47, 48 months or longer (as in the DURUNE
variable of the EuroStat Labour Force Survey)
see Annex 1 for some more details.
2. The social bene¯ts, equal for all members of the group, are calculated according
to the actual national rules. It is made with the OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models which
input the data on personal situation and output the normative net social bene¯ts.
In the context of our study, the OECD Models replace individual interviews. Since
the groups are homogeneous, it su±ces \to interview one single representative",
meaning that the results hold for the whole group. The social bene¯ts taken into







(g) employment conditional bene¯ts
(h) childcare bene¯ts
3. The social security coverage of each group of unemployed is characterized by the
net replacement rate (NRR) which is the previous-to-current net income ratio. The
OECD model computes the net income by adding earnings and social bene¯ts and
by subtracting taxes, depending on earnings and family status.
The national NRR is calculated as the weighted average of the NRRs of all the
103950 unemployment groups. Their sizes are given by the EuroStat cross-tabulation
of the population. In other words, the EuroStat provides the statistics on individual
interviews.
4. The national average NRR is used as an indicator of social security. It shows the
average degree with which social bene¯ts compensate the loss of preceding earnings.
4 Average production wage (APW)
The Average Production Wage (APW) is a measurement unit in many OECD studies.
It is calculated on yearly basis for manufacturing workers in full-time employment. A
summary of the calculation procedure can be found in OECD (2004, p. 131); for details
see OECD (2003).
The use of the APW in a study on social security allows to express social bene¯ts in
terms of national standards which considerably vary all over Europe. The APW suggests
a \normal" wage as a reference for \normal" social security bene¯ts which generosity can
be hardly expressed in absolute ¯gures. Therefore the APW is useful in situations where
money value and money amounts have di®erent meaning.
9The dynamics of national APWs is shown in Figure 1. As one can see, the last decade
exhibited a sustainable growth of wages in Europe with a few exceptions in last two
years in Switzerland, Norway, United Kingdom, and Poland with an approximately equal
decline in absolute ¯gures. It should be emphasized that for Poland the decline means
about 24%APW, whereas for the other countries it is much less signi¯cant (6, 11, and
8%, respectively).
Referring to the APW as a unit of wage measurement, it should be taken into account
that its decrease implies a relative increase in social bene¯ts. This is the case of Poland
with the 24% wage reduction in 2002{2004. It implies that the social bene¯ts, having
remained untouched, begin to seem \more generous". This is exactly the same e®ect
as after the national currency has been devaluated, imported goods appear to be more
expensive.
5 Net replacement rate (NRR)
The goal of social security is to compensate the loss of earnings and to provide means
of existence for those who do not work. The ¯rst phase of unemployment is therefore
strongly conditioned by the previous earnings, but the longer the unemployment, the more
the social bene¯ts approach some ¯xed level conditioned rather by the family situation
(spouse, income of spouse, number of children, etc.).
The generosity of social security for unemployed is de¯ned to be the previous-to-current
net income ratio, expressed in percent of previous net earnings, called Net Replacement
Rate (NRR). The NRR tends to decrease with the duration of unemployment, but in some
countries, like Denmark, can increase due to transition from unemployment insurance to
a (surprisingly) more generous social assistance.
The dynamics of NRR depends on previous earnings, age, working record, and family
situation. A sample example of the \most typical" case (one-earner couple with 2 children,
40 year-old earner, 22 years working record, earnings before unemployment 100% APW)
for 2004 is shown in Figure 2 computed with the OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models. This ¯gure
is the 2004-update of the 2002-Figure 3.1b in p. 101 (OECD 2004). These curves are
normative, that is, rule-based and are derived from national eligibility conditions with no
use of any empirical data. For instance, the black solid line for Germany exhibits an abrupt
decrease after the ¯rst year of unemployment. It means a reduction of social bene¯ts
caused by transition from unemployment insurance to a less generous social assistance.
The last step made by the OECD in evaluating national social security systems is
computing the average NRR along the 60 month of unemployment, to characterize the
average NRR-coverage during this period, and on four family types (OECD, 2004, Table
3.3a, p. 102):
As in previous editions of this publication, NRR calculations for di®erent fam-
ily types, earning levels and unemployment durations are combined to derive
an overall measure of the generosity of bene¯ts relative to net earnings. The
resulting measure is a simple average of the NRRs with each family type and
month of bene¯t receipt weighted equally. This global indicator does not in-
tend to cover all existing salary levels and family types and is not meant to
take into account the relative numbers of each of the family types consid-
10Figure 1: Growth of the Average Production Wage (APW) in European countries. Source:
Author's conversion to EUR based on output from OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models




















































































11ered. When using this measure for international comparisons, it is therefore
important to keep in mind that population structures di®er across countries.
OECD (2004, p. 99)
Thus, the OECD approach stops at this point. Our study undertakes the next step
prompted in the above quotation. Namely, the NRRs for particular personal situations
are weighted on the size of relevant groups of unemployed. For this purpose, the census-
simulating model described in Section 3 is applied.
12Figure 2: Normative NRR-curves (Net Replacement Rate) for one-earner couple with 2
children(40 year-old earner, 22 years working record, earning before unemployment 100
percent APW) for 2004. Source: Author's derivation from OECD Tax-Bene¯t models






















































































136 Evaluating European social security
The census-simulating model outputs national weighted average NRRs regarded as indices
of generosity of social security. Recall that such indices show the average degree (in
percent) with which social bene¯ts replace preceding earnings of an unemployed. Figure 3
shows the state of the European social security systems in 2004. Figure 4 is its more
detailed version, where every country is depicted by three bars. The upper bar shows
the national average NRR as in Figure 3. The middle bar (pale color) shows the NRR-
indicator for young unemployed under 25 years. The bottom bar (saturated color) shows
the indicator value for old unemployed above 55 years.
Figure 3: European social security in 2004 shown by the census-simulated national Net
Replacement Rate (NRR). Source: Author's Census-Simulating Model with the EuroStat
Labour Force Survey data and OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models














































14Figure 4: European social security in 2004 (average national Net Replacement Rates
(NRR) for all, young, and old unemployed). Source: Author's Census-Simulating Model
with the EuroStat Labour Force Survey data and OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models





























































































157 Monitoring European social security
The dynamics of national NRR-indicators is depicted in Figure 5. The common property
of the national curves is that they are, roughly speaking, cap-shaped loosely resembling
inverted parabolas. They attain some peaks during the period 1999{2002 and decrease
by 2004, meaning \the good times are over".
This viewpoint is illustrated in Figure 6, showing the change of the national NRR
by 2004 with respect to its peak in some previous year. The bottom countries have the
largest social security decline and their bars in Figure 6 are red. The higher the country
in the graph, the less the security decline, and the \more blue" is the color. Throughout
the paper, except Figures 3 and 4, every country is associated with its color from the
red{blue scale (bad{good), showing its relative rank on the 2004-decline axis.
Figure 7 is a more detailed version of Figure 6. Here, each country is depicted by
three bars, the top one showing the change of national NRRs as in Figure 6, the middle
bar showing the change of NRRs for young unemployed (< 25 years, pale color), and
the bottom bar showing the change of NRRs for old unemployed (¸ 55 years, saturated
color). This detailed representation shows, for instance, that in well-doing Luxembourg
the social security declines for young unemployed while old unemployed, on the contrary,
get some advantages.
What follows from these graphs?
² Total decline of European social security in 2004
As one can see, all European countries except Poland exhibit a social security decline
in 2004. However, the growth of Polish indicator by 0.8% is, as has been noted,
accompanied by a devaluation of the APW by 24%. With no this APW-devaluation
the Polish social system would decline by about 23%, so that the real position of
Poland in Figure 6 should be at the bottom next to Slovac Republic.
² High statistical signi¯cance of European social security decline-2004
Estimate the statistical signi¯cance of the null-hypothesis that such a decline for all
the 22 countries is just a random coincidence. As usual, assume that the countries
are independent, and every year can be the peak of a national curve with probability
1/7 (we consider seven years). Then the probability that no of 22 curves attains its
peak in 2004 is quite low, meaning that such a coincidence is very unlikely to occur
by chance:






= 0:0337 < 3:4% :
16Figure 5: Census-simulated nationally-aggregated NRR-curves (Net Replacement Rate)
weighted on the size of 450 di®erent groups of unemployed. Source: Author's Census-
Simulating Model with the EuroStat Labour Force Survey data and OECD Tax-Bene¯t
Models















































































17Figure 6: Decline of European social security by 2004 after a peak in 1995{2003 shown by
reduction of national Net Replacement Rates (NRR). Source: Author's Census-Simulating
Model with the EuroStat Labour Force Survey data and OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models














































18Figure 7: Decline of European social security by 2004 after a peak in 1995{2003 shown by
reduction of national Net Replacement Rates (NRR) for all, young, and old unemployed.
Source: Author's Census-Simulating Model with the EuroStat Labour Force Survey data
and OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models





























































































198 Analysis of decline of European social security
What are the causes of the decline of European social security?
² No decline of social security at the institutional level
In many countries the actual decline of social security occurs under institutional
improvements: \Contrary to the decline in bene¯t amounts seen in earlier period,
payment rates were made more generous in several countries" (OECD 2004, p. 116).
Some countries considerably increased their bene¯ts and some relaxed eligibility
conditions. Indeed, as reported by Adema and Ladaique (2005, p. 12) the social
expenditure in the OECD countries grows with the GDP and in certain years even
more rapidly.
For instance, the dynamics of German institutional development is shown in Figure 8
which plots are made from curves like in Figure 2 for all the seven years and for
six levels of previous earnings: 40, 50, 67, 100, 150, and 200% APW. They are
computed with the OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models under the same rule-based approach
with no statistical data. The abrupt increase in the plot relief in 2001 indicates that
social security bene¯ts became more generous for all the six earning levels. At the
same time Germany exhibits a decline of social security by 4.1% in Figure 6.
A similar situation is inherent in many other countries. The institutional develop-
ment of their social security is shown by graph reliefs in Annex 2. The color of the
graphs indicates at the country rank in Figure 6, with red meaning a considerable
decline and blue | negligible decline of social security.
² Structural change of labour markets as the only cause of decline
Our model operates both on institutional and empirical data on personal situations.
Since no institutional decline is observed, the only cause of the general decline
is a structural change in personal situations. Recall that the personal situations
are speci¯ed with family type (single, married couple with one earner, married
couple with two earners, number of children), age, and employment parameters like
previous earnings and duration of unemployment. According to EuroStat (2005),
the dynamics of family types is not much changing in the recent years. The earnings
do, as follows from 1, but together with the GDP and social expenditure (EuroStat
2005).
Therefore, the only explanations of the decline of European social securitry are
longer periods of unemployment and shorter periods of employment which disqualify
employees from high social bene¯ts. These phenomena follow from the °exibiliza-
tion of employment relations. Therefore, the °exibilization results not only in
employment insecurity but also in social insecurity, reducing the NRR due
to shorter employment periods.
20Figure 8: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemployment
for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner, 22
























































































































































219 Possible solution: Basic income model and °exin-
surance
At the beginning of the paper the following European policies have been mentioned:
² European welfare policy which suggests certain living standards independently
of employment. It assumes a stable labour market performance and is backed up
by a strong social security system.
² Flexibilization of employment relations which assumes \less state" but more
personal responsibility. The compatibility with the European welfare tradition is
imagined as a °exicurity trade-o® between the relaxation of the employment pro-
tection legislation and advances in social and employment security; see Jepsen and
Klammer (2004).
² \Make work pay" policy which is aimed at enhancing the sustainable develop-
ment by stimulating the unemployed to a more active labour market participation.
Similarly to °exicurity, the \make work pay" policy is also a trade-o®, but between
the social protection and maximizing the gain from moving to work. Contrary to
°exicurity, the \make work pay" suggests a certain reduction of security bene¯ts.
As follows from the very ideas of trade-o®s, all the three policies contradict to each
other. Since they interact through the social security system, making them consistent
means making them consistent with the social security. Or, the social security should be
made consistent with all the three policies.
The social security system has been developed for many decades. It is overcomplicated
especially in interaction with the tax system, and it is quite di±cult to change one of its
elements without a®ecting others. The unprecedented decline of European social security
in the background of institutional improvements shows that only a global reform can make
it actually e±cient and resolve policy contradictions.
A possible solution could be the basic income model together with °exinsurance (Tan-
gian 2005). The basic income model assumes a °at income paid by the state to all citizens
regardless of their earnings and property status. The traces of this model appear in some
social security branches like child care allowances. For instance, Kindergeld in Germany
is paid to all parents.
The °exinsurance assumes that the employer's contribution to social security should
be proportional to the °exibility of the contract. Thereby the higher risk of atypical em-
ployees to become unemployed will be compensated. On the other hand, such progressive
contributions will stimulate employers to hire employees more favorably, without however
rigidly restricting the labour market °exibility.
The basic income model in combination with the °exinsurance is consistent with the
three European policies mentioned and thereby resolves their contradiction:
1. Development of the welfare policy
The basic income model meets the concept of welfare state since it guarantees some
unconditional living standards and discharges the social tension. The additional
budget expenditures come from °exinsurance which also non-rigidly constrains °ex-
ibilization, from higher taxes of high-earners (to subtract the °at income) and by
the funds released from an army of civil servants currently working in social security.
222. Compensation of °exibilization according the °exicurity concept
The basic income model would mean a progress in social security and therefore
meets the idea of the °exicurity trade-o® \more °exibilization and more security".
3. Contribution to the \make work pay" policy
The basic income is not reduced while moving to work. Therefore, there can be
no situations when moving to work is little attractive due to loosing out-of-work
bene¯ts, since every work immediately improves the net income.
10 Summary
The paper suggests:
² (Methodology) a model of census simulation combining empirical data on the popu-
lation with individual answers computed with a normative rule-based model,
² (Indicator) an integral quantitative evaluation of social security in Europe, which
reveals its total decline by 2004 contrary to institutional improvements,
² (Analysis) an explanation of the decline by a structural change of European labour
markets with rapidly growing `atypical' employment groups,
² (Policy implications) a possible resolution of European policy contradictions by the
\basic income model" with \°exinsurance".
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2511 Annex 1: Implementation of the census-simulating
model
The model for this paper consists of several modules for di®erent computer environments.
Besides, a number of auxiliary programs have been developed to test the reliability of the
modules which are charged with huge data processing.
1. The ¯rst module is a MATLAB program which prepares a control ¯le (in fact,
divided into several parts due to a large size) for the OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models. The
control ¯le consists or computer commands, specifying di®erent personal situations
of unemployed and indicating two scenarios of the Tax-Bene¯t Models. They are
generated from combinations of the following 8 parameters:
(a) 22 countries
Country name Label in graphs
1 Austria AT
2 Belgium BE


















21 Slovac Republic SK
22 United Kingdom UK
(b) 7 years: 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001{2004
(c) 5 age levels: 15{24, 25{34, 35{44, 45{54, 55-65 years with corresponding work-
ing record 2, 12, 22, 32, and 42 years
(d) 3 types of family: single or lone parent, married couple with one earner, married
couple with two earners
(e) Number of children: 0{4
(f) 6 earning levels before unemployment, in % APW: 40, 50, 67, 100, 150, and
200
26(g) 9 unemployment duration periods, in months (corresponding to coding the
DURUNE variable of Labour Force Survey by the EuroStat): 0 (just become
unemployed, waiting period for security bene¯ts), < 1, 1{2, 3{5, 6{11, 12{17,
18{23, 24{47, 48 or longer
(h) 2 scenarios of Tax-Bene¯t Models: Scenario 0 for out-of-work net income and
Scenario 2 for in-work net income
Totally, the control ¯le contains 22 ¢ 7 ¢ 5 ¢ 5 ¢ 3 ¢ 9 ¢ 2 = 207900 records.
2. The second module consists of the OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models themselves. They
run under the STATA computer environment. Their input is the control ¯le created
by Module 1. The output is the 207900 ¯les with computed tax and social security
parameters which correspond to the response of the national social systems to dif-
ferent personal situations in the given year. In particular, the output contains the
average production wage in the national currency and net income (after taxes and
bene¯ts) in case of work and in 60 cases of unemployment duration 1-60 months.
3. Module 3 is a MATLAB program which collects the output of the OECD models
from the 207900 ¯les. Next, it computes NRR-indicators for all combinations of
personal parameters and converts APW into EUR.




output of Scenario 0
output of Scenario 2
for all the 103950 combinations of 7 parameters from Item 1 (the parameter with
two model scenarios is not relevant). The results are collected into a 7-dimensional
matrix NRR which elements are the NRR for the combinations of the 7 parameters.
The output of the module (¯les of 47 and 12 MB) is saved to avoid unnecessary
processing in repeated runs of the model.
4. Module 4 is a MATLAB program to process the EuroStat data with the cross-
tabulation of unemployed (represented in several EXCEL tables). Its output is a
7-dimensional Population-weighting matrix P which elements are the population
fractions in the cross-tabulation speci¯ed by the 7 parameters from Item 1.
The only statistics unavailable from the EuroStat is the income preceding the un-
employment which are processed as missing data and replaced by average values.
The output of the module is also saved separately.
5. Module 5, also a MATLAB program, computes the annual national NRR-indicators
for all, young, and old unemployed. It is done by element-by-element multiplication
of matrices NRR and P with subsequent summation of certain elements, depending
on the task.
Basing on the computations, Module 5 generates eps-¯les with the ¯gures of the
paper and a L ATEX document template which consists of ¯gure captions and calls of
the ¯gure ¯les. The given article is written by inserting text into this L ATEXtemplate
saved under a new ¯lename. If ¯gures have to be modi¯ed, Module 5 is activated
27and the ¯gure ¯les of the paper are overwritten with their new versions which are
called while recompiling the L ATEX-paper.
The run of the full program cycle takes about six hours on a PC with 2.4 GHz
Pentium IV-processor and 1GB RAM. To make new graphical output, only Module
5 should process the previously stored normative and empirical data from Modules
3 and 4. A run of Module 5 takes about ¯ve minutes.
2812 Annex 2: Visual directory of European social se-
curity systems
The following ¯gures represent the same information on 21 European countries as Figure 8
on Germany. They are derived directly from the OECD Tax-Bene¯t Models, represent-
ing normative properties of the social security systems. These ¯gures give an immediate
impression at a glance \Who, When, Where" (the year of reforms, most a®ected earning
levels, and changes in the monthly dynamics of security bene¯ts). In a sense, they con-
stitute a visual directory to the OECD (2005) country chapters downloadable from the
Internet.
The empirical aspect of our study is shown by color. The country colors are the same
as in Figures 6 and 7. A considerable 2004 decline of the national social security system
after 1995{2003 is shown by red. Blue corresponds to a negligible decline.
29Figure 9: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemployment
for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner, 22
























































































































































30Figure 10: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemploy-
ment for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner,
























































































































































31Figure 11: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemploy-
ment for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner,
























































































































































32Figure 12: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemploy-
ment for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner,
























































































































































33Figure 13: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemploy-
ment for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner,
























































































































































34Figure 14: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemploy-
ment for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner,
























































































































































35Figure 15: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemploy-
ment for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner,
























































































































































36Figure 16: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemploy-
ment for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner,
























































































































































37Figure 17: Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1{60 months of unemploy-
ment for one of 75 family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner,
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